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HYPNOTIC EVIDENCE 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
In 1897, the California Supreme Court wrote that 
"the law of the United States does not recognize 
hypnotism." People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 665, 49 
P. 1049, 1053 (1897). In 1902, a Yale Law Journal 
article warned against the dangers of hypnotically 
influenced evidence. Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hyp-
notism, 11 Yale L.J. 173, 187-89 (1902). Neverthe-
less, the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed 
testimony is one of the most litigated evidentiary 
issues currently confronting the courts. The judi-
cial response to this issue has varied. Some courts 
have upheld admissibility, while others have 
rejected it. Still other courts have imposed various 
conditions on admissibility. 
This article examines the admissibility of hyp-
notically influenced statements and testimony. 
THE TECHNIQUE 
Hypnosis is a state of heightened concentration 
with a concomitant diminished awareness of pe-
ripheral events. See Encyclopedia Britannica 133 
(15th ed. 1977) (hypnosis "refers to a sleeplike 
state that nevertheless permits a wide range of 
behavioral responses to stimulation"). The various 
techniques of hypnotic induction involve establish-
ing rapport between the subject and hypnotist; 
inducing a passiveness that makes the subject 
receptive to suggestion, often by engendering eye 
fatigue through the focusing on a close object; 
and inducing a trance-like state through a series of 
suggestions. One widely employed procedure is 
called hypnotic age regression, during which the 
subject relives an event which has occurred in the 
past. 
use of hypnosis is critical. As one commentator 
has noted: 
The clinical use of hypnosis is very different from the 
forensic use. The police officer is concerned with 
establishing facts. Psychiatrists and psychologists 
use hypnosis in an effort to alleviate distress. Hypno-
sis helps to build a trusting relationship between doc-
tor and patient which is important in the treatment 
process. It can help the patient work out symptoms 
even though his or her beliefs about his or her illness 
are entirely erroneous. Dentists, obstetricians, and 
anesthesiologists use hypnosis entirely for the control 
of pain. Levitt, The Use of Hypnosis to "Freshen" the 
Memory of Witnesses or Victims, Trial 56-58 (Apr. 
1981). 
Notwithstanding this difference, the use of hyp-
nosis in crime investigation has become wide-
spread in recent years. Two factors may account 
for this trend. First, the "technique of hypnosis 
induction is easily learned. A police officer can 
become a reasonably skilled hypnotist in a few 
hours of practice, with or without formal instruc-
tion." Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of 
Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 
Cal. L. Rev. 313, 314 (1980). Second, a number of 
books and articles on the subject have advocated 
its use. See H. Arons, Hypnosis in Criminal Investi-
gation (1967); W. Bryan, Legal Aspects of Hypnosis 
(1962); M. Teitelbaum, Hypnosis Induction Tech-
nics (1969); Reiser, Hypnosis as a Tool in Criminal 
Investigation, Police Chief 36 (Nov. 1976). The 
value of these works, however, is suspect. One 
expert has written: "These books make extrava-
gant clafms of the usefulness and reliability of 
hypnosis for criminal investigative purposes." Dia-
mond, supra, at 313 n.3. Hypnosis has been recognized as a legitimate 
subject of clinical and laboratory research. It is 
- also an accepted medical technique for psycho- THE STANDARD 
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dence derived from a new scientific technique is 
admissible only if it is "sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs." /d. at 1014. 
While the Frye test is the majority rule, a num-
ber of courts have rejected it. See U.S. v. Williams, 
583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
1117 (1979) (voiceprints); State v. Hall, 297 N. W .2d 
80 (Iowa 1980) (blood tests); State v. Williams, 388 
A.2d 500 (Me. 1978) (voiceprints). See generally 
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 
80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980); McCormick, 
Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to 
Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 879 (1982); Note, 
Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Tech-
niques: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 774 (1980). 
Even in those jurisdictions that have adopted 
the Frye test, the question remains whether that 
test should be applied to hypnotically enhanced 
evidence. This issue is discussed later in this 
article in connection with the various cases that 
have addressed it. 
HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED STATEMENTS 
Hypnotically influenced evidence can be. used in 
several different ways. For example, statements 
made by a witness while hypnotized may be 
offered at trial. In addition, the testimony of a wit-
ness whose memory has been "refreshed" by hyp-
nosis prior to trial may be offered. 
Courts have uniformly rejected statements made 
while the subject is hypnotized and offered for the 
truth of the matters asserted. In the leading case, 
Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 
S.E.2d 414 (1974), the defendant, who claimed no 
recollection of the charged offense, offered state-
ments about the offense that he made while hyp-
notized. The Virginia Supreme Court held the state-
ments inadmissible. The court rested its decision 
on the unreliability of such statements: "Most 
experts agree that hypnotic evidence is unreliable 
because a person under hypnosis can manufacture 
or invent false statements .... A person under a 
hypnotic trance is also subject to heightened sug-
gestibility." /d. at 419. In a subsequent habeas 
corpus proceeding, a federal district court agreed. 
In rejecting the defendant's due process argument, 
asserted under the authority of Chambers v. Mis-
sissippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the court wrote: "[T]he 
very reason for excluding hypnotic evidence is due 
to its potential unreliability." Greenfield v. Robin-
son, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (W.O. Va. 1976). 
Other courts have reached the same result. See 
Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d 903 (Fla. App. 1976); 
Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110, 115, 205 S.E.2d 231, 
235 (1974); Strong v. State, 435 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. 
1982); State v. Conley, 6 Kan. App.2d 280, 285, 627 
P.2d 1174, 1178 (1981); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 
886-88, 46 N.W.2d 508, 521-22 (1950); State v. 
Harris, 241 Or. 224, 237, 405 P.2d 492, 498 (1965); 
People v. Harper, 111 Ill. App.2d 204, 209, 250 
N.E.2d 5, 7 (1969); People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. 
2 
App. 718, 727-30, 273 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (1978); 
Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1326-28 (Okla. Grim. 
1975); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 30, 207 S.E.2d 
414, 418 (1974). See also Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442 
(1979). 
In People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640, 159 Cal. Rptr. 
818, 602 P.2d 738 (1979), the California Supreme 
Court also held that hypnotic statements were 
inadmissible. In addition, the court rejected the 
defendant's constitutional argument that the 
exclusion of such evidence denied him the right to 
present defense evidence under Chambers v. Mis-
sissippi. According to the court, "the trial court's 
ruling [of exclusion] did not elevate a fastidious 
adherence to the technicalities of the law of evi-
dence over the right to a fair trial. For here, unlike 
Chambers, there was no solid assurance that the 
hearsay statements were reliable." 25 Cal.3d at 
665. As one commentator has noted, these deci-
sions are supported by scientific data: 
[E]xperience with a research design where deeply hyp-
notized subjects and unhypnotizable subjects 
instructed to feign hypnosis are seen by hypnotists 
who are unaware of the subjects' actual status ... has 
shown that it is possible to deceive even highly exper-
ienced hypnotists .... Not only can individuals fake 
hypnosis, but even subjects who are genuinely in 
deep hypnosis are nonetheless able to wilfully lie .... 
Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, in 3 
Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research 61, 
64 (ed. M. Toney & H. Morris 1982). 
HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY 
Harding v. State 
The seminal case on the admissibility of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony is Harding v. State, 5 
Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 
U.S. 949 (1969). The witness in that case, Mildred 
Coley, was found wounded by a roadside, the 
apparent victim of a sexual assault. She was in a 
state of shock and could not remember what had 
occurred. After hypnosis, she provided information 
incriminating the defendant. The court summarily 
dismissed the defendant'.s objection to her testi-
mony, stating: 
The admissibility of Mildred Coley's testimony con-
cerning the assault with intent to rape causes no diffi-
culty. On the witness stand she recited the facts and 
stated that she was doing so from her own recollec-
tion. The fact that she had told different stories or 
had achieved her present knowledge after being hyp-
notized concerns the question of the weight of the evi-
dence which the trier of facts, in this case, the jury, 
must decide. 246 A.2d at 306. 
During the next decade a number of courts fol-
lowed the Harding precedent and admitted hyp-
notically refreshed testimony. The federal cases 
include: U.S. v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); U.S. v. Adams, 581 
F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 
(1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 
1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller 
Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. 
Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82 (E.D. Mich._ 1977). 
See also Annot., 50 A.l.R. Fed. 602 (1980). 
The state cases include: People v. Diggs, 112 
Cal. App. 3d 522, 169 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1980); Clark v. 
State, 379 So.2d 372, 375 (Fla. App. 1980); Creamer 
v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 138, 205 S.E.2d 240, 242 
(1974); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 (r(j N.E.2d 848 (1979); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423, 
435-36 (Mo. App. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 
450 U.S.-1027 (1981); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 
96, 119-22, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-29 (1978); State v. 
Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971). 
Although admitting hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony, some of these courts began to scrutinize 
this evidence more critically than did the Harding 
court. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Adams 
noted: "We are concerned, however, that the inves-
tigatory use of hypnosis on persons who may later 
be called upon to testify in court carries a danger-
ous potential for abuse. Great care must be exer-
cised to insure that statements after hypnosis are 
the product of the subject's own recollection, 
rather than of recall tainted by suggestions 
received while under hypnosis." 581 F.2d at 198-99. 
The court also suggested several procedural safe-
guards: "We think that, at a minimum, complete 
stenographic records of interviews of hypnotized 
persons who later testify should be maintained. 
Only if the judge, jury, and the opponent know who 
was present, questions that were asked, and the 
witness's responses can the matter be dealt with 
effectively. An audio or video recording of the 
interview would be helpful." /d. at 199 n.12. 
Similarly, the Illinois appellate court in Smrekar 
l1ii did not automatically accept the witness' state-
\1\f) ments that her testimony was based on her own 
recollection. Rather, the court also considered 
other factors: "(1) the hypnotist was shown to be 
competent, (2) the evidence indicated that sugges-
tion was not used in the hypnosis, (3) the identifi-
cation was corroborated by other substantial evi-
dence unknown to the witness at the time she 
made positive identification of the defendant, and 
(4) the evidence showed that at the time of the 
occurrence, the witness had ample opportunity to 
view him." 385 N.E.2d at 855. 
State v. Mack 
One of the first cases to reject the trend toward 
admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony 
was State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980). 
Mack was charged with criminal sexual conduct 
and aggravated assault. The alleged victim was ini-
tially unable to recall the circumstances under 
which she was injured. After hypnosis, she 
recalled the details of Mack's involvement. On 
appeal, the defendant contended that hypnotically 
refreshed testimony was inadmissible because it 
failed to meet the Frye general acceptance test. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed. The court 
found several problems with such testimony. First, 
the "hypnotized subject is highly susceptible to 
• suggestion, even that which is subtle and unin-
~> tended." Second, the "hypnotized subject is 
influenced by a need to 'fill gaps.'" Third, the sub-
ject is influenced by a "desire to please either the 
hypnotist or others who have asked the person 
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hypnotized to remember and who have urged that 
it is important that he or she remember certain 
events." Fourth, "there is no way to determine 
from the content of the 'memory' itself which parts 
of it are historically accurate, which are entirely 
fanciful, and which are lies." Finally, a memory 
"produced under hypnosis becomes hardened in 
the subject's mind. A witness who was unclear 
about his 'story' before the hypnotic session 
becomes convinced of the absolute truth of the 
account he made while under hypnosis." /d. at 
768-69. See also State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108 
(Minn. 1981) (reaffirming Mack). 
State v. Mena 
Following Mack, the Arizona Supreme Court con-
sidered the issue in State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 
624 P.2d 1274 (1981). It also rejected admissibility. 
The court found the reasoning of the cases admit-
ting hypnotically refreshed testimony flawed 
because those cases relied on two assumptions: 
(1) that witnesses' statements that they were testi-
fying from their own recollections were reliable 
and (2) that cross-examination would permit the 
jury to assess adequately the witnesses' testi-
mony. According to the court, the assumption that 
a witness is capable of determining that "what he 
perceives as his recollection actually came from 
his prior observations as opposed to impressions 
planted in his memory through hypnosis ... is con-
trary to the opinion held by many authorities .... " 
/d. at 1278. Moreover, the "faith which ... courts 
place in the power of cross-examination also 
seems misplaced ... [because the witness] will 
often be more convinced of the accuracy of such 
hypnotically induced memories than those recalled 
due to the witness' actual observations.'' /d. 
Accordingly, the court held that hypnotically 
refreshed testimony failed to satisfy the Frye gen-
eral acceptance test: "[U]ntil hypnosis gains gen-
eral acceptance in the fields of medicine and psy-
chiatry as a method by which memories are accu-
rately improved without undue danger of distor-
tion, delusion or fantasy, we feel that testimony of 
witnesses which has been tainted by hypnosis 
should be excluded in criminal cases.'' /d. at 1279. 
More importantly, the court also rested its deci-
sion on constitutional grounds: 
As mentioned above, there is a strong belief among 
several authorities that hypnotism of a witness 
renders subsequent cross-examination ineffective 
.... Until the general scientific reliability of hypno-
tism as an effective and accurate memory enhancer 
has been established and/or the barriers which it 
raises to effective cross-examination are somehow 
overcome, we think the confrontation clause of the 
Sixth Amendment requires [exclusion of the testi-
mony]. /d. at 1280. 
As discussed later, Mena was modified in one 
respect in State ex ref. Collins v. Superior Court, 
132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982). 
State v. Hurd 
The next decided case, State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 
525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), is important because the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, although recognizing 
the problems with hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony, did not hold such evidence inadmissible. 
Instead, the court ruled that hypnotically refreshed 
testimony may be admissible if the trial court finds 
that "the use of hypnosis and the procedure fol-
lowed in the particular case was a reasonably 
reliable means of restoring the witness' memory." 
/d. at 95. 
In addition, the court adopted a number of pro-
cedural requirements that had been proposed by 
Dr. Martin Orne, an expert on hypnosis. See infra. 
First, "a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced 
in the use of hypnosis must conduct the session." 
Second, "the professional conducting the hypnotic 
session should be independent of and not regu-
larly employed by the prosecutor, investigator or 
defense." Third, "any information given to the 
hypnotist by law enforcement personnel or the 
defense prior to the hypnotic session must be 
recorded, either in writing or another suitable 
form." Fourth, "before inducing hypnosis the hyp-
notist should obtain from the subject a detailed 
description of the facts as the subject remembers 
them." Fifth, "all contacts between the hypnotist 
and the subject must be recorded." According to 
the court, the "use of videotape, the only effective 
record of visual cues, is strongly encouraged but 
not mandatory." Sixth, "only the hypnotist and the 
subject should be present during any phase of the 
hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic test-
ing and the post-hypnotic interview." /d. at 96-97. 
These requirements are designed to prevent sug-
gestion, both intentional and unintentional, and to 
preserve a record for review. 
The court also held that the party seeking to 
introduce hypnotically refreshed testimony must 
establish its admissibility by clear and convincing 
evidence. /d. at 97. According to the court, the 
prosecution failed to satisfy this burden in the 
Hurd case. The court was especially concern~d 
about the conduct of a detective who repeatedly 
encouraged the witness to make an identification 
and to overcome any doubts that the witness 
~xpressed about that identification. 
One other point deserves comment. The Hurd 
court held that the use of hypnotically refreshed 
testimony met the general acceptance test of Frye, 
at least under certain conditions. In this respect, 
the court specifically rejected the conclusions of 
the courts in Mena and Mack. According to the 
Hurd court, the issue was not whether hypnosis is 
"generally accepted as a means of reviving truthful 
or historically accurate recall." /d. at 92. Instead, 
the issue is whether hypnosis "is able to yield 
recollections as accurate as those of an ordinary 
witness, which likewise are often historically inac-
curate." /d. 
Post-Hurd Cases 
The cases decided immediately after Hurd fall 
into three groups. First, several cases adopted the 
Hurd approach, applying procedural safeguards as 
a precondition to admissibility. See State v. 
Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246, 253-54 (App. 
4 
1981); People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.2d 831, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980) (specifying 9 requirements); 
People v. Lewis, 103 Misc.2d 881, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177 
(1980). See also People v. Lucas, 107 Misc.2d 231, 
435 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1980). 
A second group of cases adopted a per se rule 
of exclusion, rejecting the Hurd safeguards as 
inadequate. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania rejected the use of hypnotically 
refreshed tesf!mony in Commonwealth v. Nazaro-
vitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981), holding that 
such testimony did not satisfy the Frye general 
acceptance test. The court commented: 
The Hurd court's rationale that hypnotically-refreshed 
recollection might as well be admissible since ordi-
nary eyewitness accounts are also vulnerable to error 
and inaccuracies does not do full justice to the fact 
that "the traditional guaranties of trustworthiness as 
well as the jury's ability to view the demeanor of the 
witness are wholly ineffective to reveal distortions of 
memory induced by hypnotic process." ... It is unchal-
lenged that a jury can more critically analyze a 
witness' ability to perceive, remember, and articulate 
his recollections when such testimony has not been 
hypnotically-refreshed. /d. at 177. 
See also People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 
310 N.W.2d 306 (1981); Palmer v. State, 210 Neb. 
206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981). 
Finally, in Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 
(Wyo. 1982), the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld 
the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony. The court recognized the split in other juris-
dictions, but followed the "majority" of courts 
which tiave held that the influence of hypnosis 
affects the credibility, not the competence, of the 
witness. The court specifically declined to adopt 
the Hurd safeguards, although it commented that 
adherence to these safeguards may be advisable. 
/d. at 1283. See also Commonwealth v. Juvenile, 
412 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1980) (remand for findings 
on reliability of hypnotically aided testimony). 
People v. Shirley 
The most comprehensive decision on the admis-
sibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony was 
written by the California Supreme Court in People 
v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. 
Rptr. 243 (1982). After discussing the evolution of 
judicial opinion on the subject, the court found the 
"safeguards" announced in Hurd to be inadequate. 
According to the court, those safeguards did not 
protect against many of the dangers associated 
with hypnotically refreshed testimony: 
[W]e observe that certain dangers of hypnosis are not 
even addressed by the Hurd requirements: virtually all 
of those rules are designed to prevent the hypnotist 
from exploiting the suggestibility of the subject; none 
will directly avoid the additional risks, recognized 
elsewhere in Hurd, that the subject (1) will lose his 
critical judgment and begin to credit "memories" that 
were formerly viewed as unreliable, (2) will confuse 
actual recall with confabulation and will be unable to , 
distinguish between the two, and (3) will exhibit an \_0 
unwarranted confidence in the validity of his ensuing 
recollection. /d. at 255. 
The court next held that the Frye general accept-
ance test was the applicable standard for deter-
mining the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed 
testimony, rejecting arguments that the Frye test 
applied only to expert testimony or to new tech-
~ niques involving physical evidence. /d. at 263-64. 
1 The court also explicitly rejected an earlier Califor-
nia decision, People v. Diggs, 112 Cal. App. 3d 522, 
169 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1980), which had found that hyp-
notically refreshed testimony satisfied the Frye 
test. Finally, after canvassing the scientific litera-
ture on the subject, the court found that hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony was not generally 
accepted by the scientific community. /d. at 272. 
In the course of its opinion, the court enumer-
ated the principal dangers of such evidence: 
1. Hypnosis is by its nature a process of sugges-
tion, and one of its primary effects is that the person 
hypnotized becomes extremely receptive to sugges-
tions that he perceives as emanating from the hyp-
notist .... 
2. The person under hypnosis experiences a com-
pelling desire to please the hypnotist by reacting posi-
tively to these suggestions, and hence to produce the 
particular responses he believes are expected of 
him .... 
3. During the hypnotic session, neither the subject 
nor the hypnotist can distinguish between true memo-
ries and pseudomemories of various kinds in the 
reported recall; and when the subject repeats that 
recall in the waking state (e.g., in a trial), neither an 
expert witness nor a lay observer (e.g., the judge or 
jury) can make a similar distinction .... 
4. Nor is such guarantee [of veracity] furnished by 
the confidence with which the memory is initially 
reported or subsequently related: a witness who is 
uncertain of his recollections before being hypnotized 
will become convinced by that process that the story 
he told under hypnosis is true and correct in every 
respect. /d. at 271-72. 
The court, however, did outline several limita-
tions on its holding. First, it noted that a "pre-
viously hypnotized witness is not incompetent in 
the strict sense .... Accordingly, if the prosecution 
should wish to question such a witness on a topic 
wholly unrelated to the events that were the sub-
ject of the hypnotic session, his testimony as to 
that topic would not be rendered inadmissible by 
the present rule." /d. at 273. Second, the court did 
not foreclose the use of hypnosis for "purely inves-
tigative purposes." /d. Third, the court held that 
the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony 
is not "reversible per se." /d. at 274. 
Recent Cases 
In People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17, 452.N.Y.S.2d 
929 (1982), a New York appellate court ruled hyp-
notically refreshed testimony inadmissible on the 
grounds that such evidence had not achieved gen-
eral acceptance under the Frye test. Until the 
issue is settled by the N.Y. Court of Appeals, 
Hughes would appear to overrule a number of N.Y. 
trial court opinions, cited above, that had per-
mitted the use of such testimony. 
In Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 
1272 (1982), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
:>verrufed the Harding case, holding that hypnoti-
5 
cally refreshed testimony had not been generally 
accepted by the scientific community as required 
by Frye. As noted above, Harding had been the 
seminal case admitting such evidence. In the inter-
val between Harding and Collins, the court had 
upheld admissibility in State v. Temoney, 45 Md. 
App. 569, 414 A.2d 240 (1980), vacated on other 
grounds, 290 Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018 (1981), and 
presaged the Collins result in Polk v. State, 48 Md. 
App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981), when it remanded 
that case for a trial court determination on the 
general acceptance issue. 
In Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. 1982), 
the Indiana Supreme Court held that "the fact of 
hypnosis should be a matter of weight with the 
trier of fact but not a per se disqualification of the 
witness." /d. at 473. Thus, the controversy 
continues. The courts are divided into three 
groups: (1) those adopting a per se rule of 
exclusion, (2) those conditioning admissibility on 
compliance With procedural safeguards, and (3) 
those holding that hypnosis affects the weight, but 
not admissibility, of the evidence. 
See also Burnett v. State, 32 Grim. L. Rptr. 2175 
(Tex. Grim. App. Oct. 27, 1982) (en bane) (tape of 
prehypnotic interview of defendant protected by 
attorney-client privilege). 
EXPERT OPINIONS 
Two experts, Drs. Bernard Diamond and Martin 
Orne, have played influential roles in the court 
decisions. Indeed, in People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 
18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 234, 270 n.45 (1982), 
the California Supreme Court identified these two 
experts as the "most persuasive spokesmen for 
the relevant scientific community." Dr. Diamond's 
views are set forth in Diamond, Inherent Problems 
in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective 
Witness, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 313 (1980): 
I believe that once a potential witness has been hyp-
notized for the purpose of enhancing memory his 
recollections have been so contaminated that he is 
rendered effectively incompetent to testify. Hypno-
tized persons, being extremely suggestible, graft onto 
their memories, fantasies or suggestions deliberately 
or unwittingly communicated by the hypnotist. After 
hypnosis the subject cannot differentiate between a 
true recollection and a fantasy or a suggested detail. 
Neither can any expert or trier of fact. This risk is so 
great, in my view, that the use of hypnosis by police 
on a potential witness is tantamount to the destruc-
tion or fabrication of evidence. /d. at 314. 
Dr. Martin Orne, the second expert, although in 
agreement with most of Dr. Diamond's positions, 
does differ in one important respect: he is unwill-
ing to state categorically that hypnotically 
influenced testimony should never be used at trial. 
Instead, he has proposed a number of safeguards 
that should be followed before such testimony is 
admitted. These safeguards were initially incorpor-
ated in an amicus curiae affidavit which was filed 
in Quagfino v. California, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 
(1978), and became the basis for the safeguards 
eventually adopted by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Hurd, supra. It is important to note that 
these safeguards are minimum requirements. 
"Orne maintains that the use of these safeguards 
may not prevent contamination." Note, The Use of 
Hypnosis to Refresh Memory: Invaluable Tool or 
Dangerous Device?, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 1059, 1075 
(1982). 
Dr. Orne has written: 
[H]ypnosis may be useful in some instances to help 
bring back forgotten memories following an accident 
or a crime while in others a witness might, with the 
same conviction, produce information that is totally 
inaccurate. This means that material produced during 
hypnosis or immediately after hypnosis, inspired by 
hypnotic revivification, may or may not be historically 
accurate, As long as this material is subject to inde· 
pendent verification, its utility is considerable and the 
risk attached to the procedure minimal. There is no 
way, however, by which anyone-even a psychologist 
or psychiatrist with extensive training in the field of 
hypnosis-can for any particular piece of information 
determine whether it is an actual memory or a con-
fabulation unless there is independent verification. 
Thus, there are instances when subsequently verified 
accurate license plate numbers were recalled in hyp-
nosis by individuals who previously could not remem· 
ber them. In the Chowchilla kidnapping case ... , the 
license plate number was helpful in the initial investi· 
gation of the case (although ultimately not required in 
the courtroom because of the abundance of other evi-
dence available). On the other hand, a good many 
license plate numbers that have been recalled under 
hypnosis by witnesses in other cases in fact belonged 
to cars and drivers none of which, as it turned out 
after investigation, could have been involved. Orne, 
The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, In 3 Crime 
and Justice: An Annual Review of Research 61, 73-74 
(ed. M. Toney & N. Morris 1982). 
PREHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY 
Most of the cases discussed above focus on the. 
admissibility of testimony or statements obtained 
during or after hypnosis. A related issue involves 
the admissibility of testimony concerning matters 
recalled prior to hypnosis. In People v. Shirley, 
supra, the CaliforniaSupreme Court, while not 
foreclosing the investigative use of hypnosis, 
made it clear that a hypnotized witness was 
incompetent to testify about facts discussed in the 
hypnotic session. The witness, however, could tes-
tify about unrelated matters. /d. at 273-74. 
In State v. Mena, discussed above, the Arizona 
Supreme Court took the same position. That court, 
however, modified its position in a later case. 
State ex rei. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 
180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (supplemental opinion). In 
Collins, several rape victims had been hypnotized 
in an attempt to discover more information about 
the identity of the assailant. No new information 
developed from this process. The defendant was 
later apprehended as he approached a police 
decoy; The defense, citing Mena, moved to dis-
qualify the victims as witnesses. The court reaf-
firmed its earlier position, holding hypnotically 
influenced testimony inadmissible because of its 
inherent unreliability and its impingement on the 
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination. /d. at 
1269. The court also rejected admissibility condi-
6 
tioned upon procedural safeguards: "Safeguards 
cannot render the hypnotically recalled testimony 
reliable and therefore admissible." /d. at 1273. In 
addition, the court held that the Mena holding pre-
cluded the testimony of all hypnotized witnesses 
at trials after Mena was decided. /d. at 1276. 
Accordingly, the victims in Collins were incom-
petent. 
On a motion for rehearing, the court modified 
Mena and its prior decision in Collins. The court 
again held that hypnotically enhanced testimony 
failed to satisfy the Frye test; it also rejected 
again the Hurd safeguards. Nevertheless, the court 
modified one aspect of its prior holdings: "[A] wit-
ness will be permitted to testify with regard to 
those matters which he or she was able to recall 
and relate prior to hypnosis. Thus, for example, the 
rape victim would be free to testify to the occur-
.,r_ence of the crime, the lack of consent, the injury 
inflicted and the like, assuming that such matters 
were remembered and related to the authorities 
prior to use of hypnosis." /d. at 1295. This 
investigatory use of hypnosis, according to the 
court, must be accompanied by safeguards. /d. at 
1296. The court also acknowledged that even 
under this approach, the police "will seldom dare 
... use hypnosis as an investigatory tool because 
they will thereby risk making the witness incompe-
tent if it is later determined the testimony of that 
witness is essential." /d. at 1295. 
The Collins position has been accepted by other 
courts. See Strong v. State, 435 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. 
1982); State v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 
N.W.2d 387 (1981); State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108 
(Minn. 1981); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 
N.W.2d 648 (1981) (concurring opinion); People v. 
Hughes, 88 A.D. 2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929, 932 (1982); 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 439 A.2d 805 (Pa. Super. 
1982). See also State v. Commeau, 438 A.2d 454, 
458 (Me. 1981). This approach appears to differ 
from the California position set forth in Shirley. It 
also conflicts with Dr. Diamond's position that 
once hypnotized, the witness' testimony is "con-
taminated." 
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